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Abstract 
 
This paper establishes the existence of a previously overlooked relationship between 
agglomeration and hours worked.  Among non-professionals, hours worked decrease with the 
density of workers in the same occupation.  Among professionals, a positive relationship is 
found.  This relationship is twice as strong for the young as for the middle-aged.  Moreover, 
young professional hours worked are shown to be especially sensitive to the presence of rivals.  
We show that these patterns are consistent with the selection of hard workers into cities and the 
high productivity of agglomerated labor.  The behavior of young professionals is also consistent 
with the presence of keen rivalry in larger markets, a kind of urban rat race.  This evidence of a 
rat race is nearly unique in the literature.
I. Introduction  
“ [In New York] [e]very man seems to feel that he has got the duties of two lifetimes to 
accomplish in one, and so he rushes, rushes, rushes, and never has time to be companionable - 
never has any time at his disposal to fool away on matters which do not involve dollars and duty 
and business.”   Mark Twain, Letter to Alta California, 11 August 1867. 
 
“The twelve labors of Hercules were trifling in comparison with those which my neighbors have 
undertaken; for they were only twelve, and had an end; but I could never see that these men slew 
or captured any monster or finished any labor” Henry David Thoreau, Walden, Chapter 1: 
Economy (1854).  
 
 It is not a new idea that cities are busy places, as the quotes from Twain and Thoreau 
show.  It is also not an idea without current relevance.  If anything, modern life is more hurried 
than was life in the Nineteenth Century.  For instance, a recent ABC News Poll found that 26% 
of Americans believed they worked too hard.1  Despite this, the connection between spatial 
concentration and the intensity of work has for the most part escaped attention in both labor and 
urban economics.  In the literature on labor supply (see Pencavel (1986) for a survey), there has 
been almost no attention paid to agglomeration.2  In the literature on agglomeration economies, 
the focus has been on labor productivity and growth rather than on hours worked.3 
 This paper considers the relationship between agglomeration and hours worked.  It makes 
three contributions.  First, it shows that there is a consistent relationship between agglomeration 
and the intensity of work.  Second, it establishes that the impact of agglomeration varies across 
the labor market, with important differences between young and middle-aged workers and 
                                                 
1The same poll finds overwork to be a cause of mistakes at work and of health problems.  In a similar vein, Schor 
(1991) uses CPS data on reported work hours to conclude that leisure has declined since the late 1960s.  In contrast, 
Robinson and Bostrom (1994) use time diaries, concluding that leisure has increased. 
 
2The only exceptions have been the inclusion of metropolitan area population or urban dummies.  
 
3See Rosenthal and Strange (2003b) for an empirical survey or Fujita and Thisse (2001) for theory.  Glaeser et al 
(1992), Henderson et al (1995), and Ciccone and Hall (1996) are important empirical contributions. 
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between professionals and non-professionals.  The paper's third contribution is to test for various 
explanations of the agglomeration-hours worked pattern that appears in the data.    
 We begin with an illustration.  Using data from the 5% Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series (IPUMS), Table 1 reports average hours worked by full-time male employees for the three 
largest cities and three much smaller nearby cities located beyond typical commuting distance 
(respectively, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and Hartford, Milwaukee, Sacramento).4  The 
data are partitioned into young men in their 30’s and middle aged men in their 40’s, and also into 
professionals and non-professionals.5  The table documents a clear relationship between hours 
worked and agglomeration.  For non-professionals, average hours worked are similar for the two 
groups of cities and for each age class.  In contrast, professionals work roughly 1 hour longer in 
the larger cities.  Moreover the difference in hours worked is greater among the young than the 
middle-aged.  This pattern also is apparent among male lawyers and judges, a profession famous 
for its long hours worked (Landers et al (1996)).  Young lawyers, for example, worked roughly 2 
hours longer in the bigger cities on average, 50.05 versus 47.71.  In contrast, among middle-aged 
male lawyers there is little difference in average hours worked.  Taken as a whole, Table 1 
suggests that there is a positive relationship between agglomeration and hours worked for 
professionals, but not for non-professionals.   This evidence of work behavior differing between 
professionals and non-professionals echoes Colemen and Pencavel (1993a and b), who report 
                                                 
4Full-time is defined as those working at least 35 hours per week.  Summary measures based on a cut-off of 40 hours 
per week are similar, with the average hours worked slightly higher for each category as would be expected.  We 
also conducted all of the analysis in this paper separately for female workers.  Results were similar although 
somewhat weaker, and are not reported to conserve space. 
 
5Professionals are defined as individuals in Census occupations in the Professional-Technical group who also have a 
Masters degree or higher.  Non-professionals are defined as individuals in all other occupations except managers and 
agricultural workers who also have less than a college degree.  Person sampling weights available in the IPUMs 
(perwt) were used to ensure that the estimates in Table 1 are representative. 
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that hours worked has increased over time among educated workers in the U.S., while hours 
worked have fallen among less educated workers. 
 What forces might be responsible for this pattern?  One is that big city workers may 
choose longer hours because their work is more productive and therefore better rewarded.  
Another is that hard workers may be drawn to large cities.  A third explanation is that there is 
more rivalry in large markets, leading workers to choose long hours as a way to signal ability.  
We characterize this as an “urban rat race”.  Finally, it is also possible that adding workers to a 
local labor market could reduce individual hours worked as the total workload is spread over a 
larger number of individuals.  These forces yield different predictions about the agglomeration-
hours worked relationship. 
 We test for the presence of these forces using full-time workers from the 1990 5% 
IPUMS of the Decennial Census.  Among non-professionals, increased spatial concentration of 
workers in the individual’s occupation is associated with fewer hours worked, consistent with 
work spreading.  The opposite is true for professional workers of all ages.  Among these 
workers, hours increase with the density of employment in the worker’s occupation and location, 
consistent with the presence of selection and productivity effects.  Moreover, the latter effect is 
twice as large for young professionals as for middle-aged professionals.  
 To investigate these patterns further, we augment the professional models with controls 
for local labor market rivals and the financial rewards to advancement.  When the rewards to 
getting ahead are zero, the presence of rivals has a negative effect on hours worked for both 
young and middle-aged professionals.  This effect is of nearly the same magnitude for both 
groups.  This implies that when the rewards to getting ahead are limited, young professionals 
behave in a manner similar to middle-aged professionals.  However, as the rewards to getting 
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ahead increase, the presence of rivals has a positive influence on hours worked that is sharply 
higher for young professionals as compared to middle-aged professionals.  Our estimates imply 
that in large cities such as New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, the presence of rivals increases 
young professional work hours by the equivalent of a standard work week over the course of a 
year – a large effect.  These findings are consistent with the rivalry explanation of the urban rat 
race. 
 The paper's results are quite robust, holding for an extensive set of occupation-MSA 
fixed effects.  In addition, results of a wage model reinforce our interpretation of the hours 
model.   The key finding is that wage rates increase with the density of employment in the 
worker’s occupation, regardless of age and professional status.  However, this effect is 
substantially larger for middle-aged professionals and smallest for non-professionals, suggesting 
that agglomeration enhances productivity most for the skilled.  In addition, the extra hours 
worked generated by rivalrous behavior among young professionals is shown to reduce wage 
rates among this group.  That pattern is consistent with diminishing productivity and worker 
fatigue, which would be anticipated when workers divert their efforts from production to 
signaling activities. 
 Although the paper’s primary purpose is to advance the understanding of urban labor 
markets by documenting the relationship between labor supply and agglomeration, the paper also 
advances the understanding of rat race effects.  Akerlof's (1976) paper is fundamental in the vast 
literature on adverse selection in labor markets.  Despite this, there has been little empirical work 
on the rat race.  The best test to date is Landers et al (1996), who survey lawyers in two large 
firms in large Northeastern cities.  They identify a rat race in several ways.  First, they show that 
lawyers work long hours, especially young ones, and that these lawyers would like to reduce 
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hours even if this were to mean lower income.  Second, they show that both associates and 
partners perceive hours worked as being crucial in determining which associates will be accepted 
as partners.  As with Landers et al, we consider the different situations faced by younger and 
older workers.  In contrast to Landers et al, we look across all occupations and cities rather than 
analyzing a single occupation in a single firm or city.  In addition, we examine actual hours 
worked rather than relying on survey evidence on worker satisfaction and attitudes. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses our data and 
variable construction and documents the relationship between agglomeration and hours worked.  
Section III looks at several explanations of the observed relationship, including productivity, 
selection, and rivalry.  Section IV concludes. 
 
II. Agglomeration and labor supply:  stylized facts 
A. Data and variables 
This section documents the relationship between agglomeration and labor supply using 
the IPUMs data described above.6  As before, we include only full-time workers in the analysis, 
defined as those who reported that their usual hours worked were 35 or more per week.  We also 
experiment with a sample based on individuals working 40 hours per week or more.  Results for 
this latter group are nearly identical to those from the 35 hours-plus sample and are not reported.7 
As in Table 1, we divide workers into two occupational groups.  Professional workers are 
defined to be individuals in Census occupations categorized as “Professional” or “Technical” 
                                                 
6See www.ipums.org.  
 
7We also ran the models setting the minimum hours worked to 1 hour or more per week.  For men results were little 
changed.  For women results differed owing to the substantial number of part-time workers. 
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who also have a Masters or more for educational attainment.8  Non-Professional workers are 
defined to be those who have less than a Bachelors degree and belong to all other occupational 
categories except farmers and managers.9  Individuals not belonging to one of these two groups 
are excluded from the sample.  This ensures that our division of workers into Professional and 
Non-Professional categories is as meaningful as possible.10  In addition, in all of the estimated 
models, each of these groups is further subdivided into young and middle-aged men and women, 
where young workers are between age 30 through 39, and middle-aged workers are between age 
40 through 49. 
Our primary goal is to identify the various dimensions of the agglomeration-hours 
worked relationship.  To do this we must control for the influence of individual-specific 
attributes.  In part this is because unobserved wage rates affect an individual’s willingness to 
supply labor, but wage rates themselves are sensitive to an individual’s skills and attributes.  
Accordingly, in all of the empirical models to follow we control for the worker’s level of 
education, the presence of children, marital status, age, race, years of residency in the United 
States, and commute times.  In addition, we also control for occupation fixed effects in order to 
capture unobserved productivity differences across occupations.  Such differences further affect 
wage rates and hours worked.11 
                                                 
8 This includes individuals with a Masters, Professional of Ph.D. degree. 
 
9The occupational categories were defined based on the OCC1950 variable in the IPUMs data file. In addition, 
occupations excluded from both Professional-Technical workers and Non-Professionals include Farmers and farm 
managers (occ1950>=100 & occ1950<=123), Managers, Officials, and Proprietors (occ1950>=200 & 
occ1950<=290), Non-occupational responses (cc1950>=980 & occ1950<=997), NA-blank (occ1950==999) and any 
observations with missing values for OCC1950. 
 
10For example, many individuals indicate that they work in professional or technical occupations but have less than a 
Masters degree, and in some cases, less than a college degree. Regressions based on these individuals suggested that 
their behavior becomes similar to that of the Non-Professionals defined above as the level of education falls. 
 
11Wage rates are not included directly in the model because of concerns about endogeneity. This issue arises in 
nearly all hours worked studies, but is especially tricky when using the PUMS data where wage is not directly 
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 For all of the labor supply models, we use the log of hours worked per week as the 
dependent variable.  Specifically, we use the usual hours worked per week in the last year.12  It is 
widely understood that male and female labor market participation differs, so we estimate 
separately for the two genders.  Only the male results are presented here.  The female results are 
similar, if slightly weaker.  Finally, for all of the models to follow, t-ratios are calculated based 
on robust standard errors that are further clustered based on the Work PUMAs.  This tends to 
work in the direction of lowering the reported t-ratios but allows for a more general pattern of 
residuals. 
 
B. Urbanization and hours worked 
 We begin by regressing log hours on occupation fixed effects, worker attributes, and a 
measure of urbanization, the log population density of the Work PUMA (PopDen).  Work 
PUMAs have an average of roughly 210,000 people in residence and range from just over 
100,000 people present to over 3 million.13  The popular notion that urban life is busy and 
preliminary summary measures in Table 1 both suggest that individuals work longer hours in 
larger cities, leading one to expect a positive coefficient on PopDen.  However, if there is a 
limited amount of work to be done, then having more workers of a particular type might tend to 
result in each working shorter hours, ceteris paribus.  If this kind of work-spreading occurs, this 
                                                                                                                                                             
reported.  Instead, hourly wage rates are calculated by dividing annual wage earnings by the number of weeks 
worked in the previous year and the usual number of hours worked per week.  See Kahn and Lang (1991) for a 
discussion of this reduced-form approach.   
  
12In the IPUMS this is measured using UHRSWORK. 
 
13Work PUMAs correspond to regions identified by the first three digits of the 5-digit residential PUMA code.  
Large metropolitan areas have numerous work PUMAs, but in rural areas a single work PUMA can cover a large 
geographic area.  Information on the population and geographic area of each residential PUMA was obtained from 
the Census Mable geographic engine available on the web (See http://www.census.gov/plue/ ).  Residential PUMAs 
were then matched to their corresponding work PUMAs, enabling us to calculate the work PUMA population and 
land area.  Dividing yields the population density of the work PUMA (PopDen). 
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would imply the opposite sign on PopDen.  The possibility that workers might concentrate in this 
way in equilibrium is consistent with various models, including Harris-Todaro (1970) on urban 
unemployment and MacDonald (1988) on rising stars.14   
 Results are presented in Table 2.  We consider young professionals first.  For young 
workers, hours worked are 4.3 percent higher for individuals with a Ph.D. or professional degree 
in comparison to the omitted category of workers with a Masters degree.  Among middle-aged 
professionals the influence of a higher degree is nearly identical, 4.6 percent.  Both estimates are 
highly significant.  For both age groups, the presence of children does not have a significant 
effect on hours worked.  Married individuals work 1.2 percent and 2.0 percent longer among 
young and middle-aged workers, respectively.  Age has no effect for either group.  African 
Americans work 2.7 percent and 2.8 percent less than the omitted white group for young and 
middle-aged workers, respectively.  Similar effects are present for Asian and Hispanic workers 
and once more, estimates are similar across age groups.  Immigrant status has varying effects 
that differ in some instances across age groups.  The influence of log commute times is negative 
and similar for both age groups.  Finally, for non-professionals, the variables above have similar 
qualitative effects on hours worked.  The principal exception is the presence of children, which 
has a strong positive effect on non-professional hours.   
 Several patterns are notable in these results.  First, the coefficients agree with priors about 
the influence of household attributes on labor supply.  Second, for non-professional workers, 
estimates are similar for young and middle-aged workers, a pattern that will extend to the 
agglomeration variables to follow.  Third, coefficient estimates for young professionals also are 
                                                 
14Harris and Todaro (1970) show that when the urban wage is fixed above the market clearing level, there can be 
unemployment in equilibrium.  In Macdonald (1988), the possibility of a rewarding career as a "star" leads a large 
number of young workers to participate in the contest determining who gets to be a star.    
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similar to those for middle-aged professionals.  However, this pattern will not extend to the role 
of agglomeration. 
 We now consider the influence of log-population density on hours worked.  Among non-
professionals, the elasticity of hours worked with respect to population density of the 
individual’s Work PUMA is negative and similar in magnitude for both age groups.  This is 
consistent with work-spreading.  In contrast, the elasticity among professional workers is 
positive and significant for younger workers but twenty times smaller, close to zero, and 
insignificant for older workers.  Thus, urbanization has a positive effect on the labor supply of 
young professionals, but has either an insignificant or a negative effect on other workers.   
 
C. Localization and hours worked 
 Do the estimates from Table 2 imply that population density per se is associated with 
longer hours worked by young professional workers?  Not necessarily.  Perhaps instead a worker 
is motivated more by the presence of workers in the same occupation.  After all, lawyers do not 
compete with doctors in the labor market.  To consider this possibility, we add a control for the 
occupation-specific employment density of a work PUMA (OccDen).   This was done by adding 
up the number of full-time workers (35 or more hours per week, as noted above) between the 
ages of 30 to 65 in each occupation for each work PUMA – weighted by the person weights in 
the IPUMS to ensure a representative sample – and then dividing by the geographic area of the 
work PUMA.  This variable was calculated separately for each of the occupations in the 
Professional-Technical group and each of the occupations in the Non-Professional group, a total 
of just over two hundred occupations.  Following Hoover (1948), we refer to this as a measure of 
localization. 
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 Table 3 reports results with the localization variable OccDen included in the model.  To 
simplify presentation, only the coefficients on the agglomeration variables are reported.  In 
addition, the PopDen coefficients from the models in Table 2 are also presented to facilitate 
comparison. 
 Beginning once more with the non-professionals (the last four columns of Table 3), for 
both age groups, adding the localization variable causes the population density coefficient to 
change from negative and highly significant, to positive, close to zero, and clearly insignificant.  
In contrast, the elasticity of hours worked with respect to OccDen is - 0.16 percent and 
significant for both age groups.  Once more this is consistent with the presence of work-
spreading, but in this case the effect arises from proximity to workers in the same occupation and 
not from city size per se. 
 Among professional workers, localization effects also appear to dominate.  For young 
workers the elasticity of hours worked with respect to OccDen is .43 percent and highly 
significant.  Among middle-aged workers the elasticity with respect to OccDen is smaller, just 
.23 percent with a t-ratio of 2.35.  In contrast, PopDen now has a negative impact on hours 
worked for both age groups, though significant only for the younger workers. 
 In sum, this section has presented evidence that labor supply varies systematically with 
agglomeration.  The strongest pattern is for young professionals.  They work longer hours when 
there is a high density of other workers in the same occupation.   The elasticity is roughly twice 
as a large for young professionals as for middle-aged professionals.  Non-professionals, in 
contrast, work fewer hours when there are many similar workers nearby.    
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III. Agglomeration and labor supply:  explanations 
A. Productivity, selection, and the urban rat race 
 There are many factors that might lead to some sort of positive relationship between 
agglomeration and labor supply among professional workers.  This section will consider three:  
productivity, selection, and rivalry among workers that produces a sort of rat race.  The 
productivity channel is easy to understand.  There is compelling evidence that agglomeration 
increases productivity (see the literature review in Rosenthal and Strange (2003b)).  If workers 
are paid for extra hours, either through an explicit wage or some sort of implicit contract, then 
agglomeration and related productivity gains will encourage workers to choose longer hours. 
 Several kinds of selection can lead to a positive relationship between agglomeration and 
labor supply.  As above, if workers are more productive when agglomerated, then those with a 
taste for long hours will be well-rewarded for choosing cities.  This leads naturally to a positive 
relationship.  This is related to Leamer (1999), who argues that employers seek to match 
expensive capital with workers who will take best advantage of it.  Agglomeration is like an 
expensive piece of capital:  urbanization enhances productivity but urban land rents are high.  
Urban entrepreneurs, therefore, will seek out industrious workers, while industrious workers will 
be lured to urban areas by the promise of higher wages.  Selection can also occur if hard working 
professionals have a taste for theater, fine restaurants, and other consumption amenities that are 
more readily found in large cities.  Both the wage- and consumption-selection mechanisms have 
the potential to draw industrious workers to cities, contributing to a positive relationship between 
agglomeration and hours worked. 
 The effect of rivalry on labor supply in cities is more complicated.  Here we appeal to 
Akerlof's (1976) classic signaling model.  He supposes that workers are heterogeneous in type, 
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with higher-type workers being both more productive and more willing to work long hours.  The 
latter is obviously related to the Spence (1973) condition.  Under some circumstances, a rat race 
equilibrium exists, with all workers except those of the lowest type working harder than they 
would like in order to avoid being mistaken for lower-type workers and paid accordingly.  This 
result depends crucially on local labor markets being relatively “thick”.  Unless there is a low-
type worker who is fairly close in ability, a high-type worker need not buy into the rat race and 
work long hours in order to signal.  Urban markets are thick, of course.  This means that a 
worker in a large city may choose to work harder in order to be distinguished from rivals, 
especially if the rewards to advancement are high. 
 This rat race discussion is quite particular.  The idea that rivalry is keener in larger 
markets is much more general.  For instance, in a patent race, a larger number of competitors 
results in a larger equilibrium level of research and development (Lee and Wilde (1980)).  Also, 
in independent values first-price auctions, a larger number of rivals leads each individual to bid 
an amount closer to his or her actual valuation (McAfee and McMillan (1988)).  Thus, there are 
many situations where a larger market leads to more vigorous competition. 
 
B. Predictions of the explanations 
 Productivity, selection, and rivalry can all explain some sort of positive relationship 
between agglomeration and hours worked.  However, the three forces have very different 
implications for the form that the relationship will take.  One difference concerns the sorts of 
occupations that are likely to exhibit a positive relationship between market size and work hours.  
In the presence of productivity effects, workers put in long hours because they are compensated 
 13
for doing so.  Because of selection-wage effects, industrious workers are drawn to agglomerated 
areas anticipating this compensation.  These patterns should apply to workers in all occupations. 
 On the other hand, in the rivalry explanation, workers put in long hours in order to signal 
their ability.  These effects are likely to be stronger in occupations where productivity cannot be 
easily monitored, and where reputation building is important.  Such conditions are often 
characteristic of professional occupations, where output is somewhat intangible.  This is in 
contrast to non-professional occupations, where output is more readily identified.  In addition, 
professionals typically work for a salary, while most non-professionals work for an hourly wage.  
This weakens the link between output and compensation for professionals relative to non-
professionals.  Taken together, these differences suggest that rivalry effects will lead to a 
stronger agglomeration-market size relationship for professional occupations than in non-
professionals occupations. 
 Another difference between the productivity, selection, and rivalry explanations concerns 
work hours over an individual’s lifetime.  Returning to the rivalry explanation, it is likely that 
after a worker has been active in the labor market for many years, then firms will no longer be 
uncertain about the worker's type.  This would be consistent with models of job ladders (i.e., 
MacLeod and Malcomson (1988)).  In this situation, later in their careers, workers would no 
longer need to work longer hours to distinguish themselves from their less-able coworkers.  This 
implies that the effect of agglomeration on work hours should be lower for older workers.   
 The life-cycle predictions of the rivalry explanation are not shared by the productivity or 
selection-wage explanations.  As long as productivity is higher for all workers – there is no 
evidence otherwise in the agglomeration literature – then workers would continue to take 
advantage of high urban productivity and work long hours.  Similarly, industrious workers will 
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be drawn to agglomerated areas in order to take advantage of higher wages.  It seems likely that 
these effects would not erode over a worker's life.  Consequently, in both the productivity and 
selection-wage explanations, the effect of agglomeration on work hours is likely to persist.  This 
implies that localization effects should be relatively similar for young and middle-aged workers. 
 One final difference depends the nature of agglomeration itself, specifically city size 
versus the spatial concentration of a given occupation.  Urban consumer amenities (e.g. theater) 
are likely associated more with the size and density of the entire city rather than with the density 
of a given occupation.  For that reason, selection-consumption effects are likely captured by the 
PopDen variable in Model 2 of Table 2 and are unlikely to account for the positive relationship 
between localization (OccDen) and hours worked among professionals. 
 Thus far, our discussion of the explanations linking hours worked and agglomeration has 
emphasized labor supply.  As suggested earlier, labor demand may also play a role.  If there is a 
limited amount of work to be done, having more workers of a particular type will tend to result 
in each working shorter hours, ceteris paribus.  This has the potential to affect the hours worked 
of both young and middle-aged workers.  In addition, the effect will presumably be stronger for 
non-professional workers, since they must be paid overtime.15    
 Summarizing, from a supply side perspective, the rivalry, productivity, and selection 
explanations all imply a positive relationship between hours worked and localization, at least in 
some circumstances.  These explanations never imply a negative relationship.  The supply side 
explanations predict different patterns of labor supply for different types of occupations and age 
groups.  From a demand side perspective, a work-spreading effect is predicted.   
                                                 
15 The Fair Labor Act of 1938 requires that employers pay 1-1/2 times the regular wage for hours worked beyond a 
"standard" work week (Pencavel (1986)).  The law was modified in 1940 to set the standard week at 40 hours for a 
wide range of non-professional occupations. 
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C. Urbanization and localization revisited 
 This suggests that differencing strategies can shed light on the agglomeration-hours 
worked relationship.  We return, therefore, to the patterns in Model 2 of Table 3.  In this model 
the coefficients on urbanization (PopDen) for young and middle-aged non-professionals are both 
nearly equal to zero, while the coefficients on localization (OccDen) are negative, significant, 
and identical in magnitude.  This pattern is consistent with work spreading, but offers little 
evidence of selection, productivity, or rivalry. 
 Among professional workers, the most important patterns concern the localization 
variable, OccDen.  The coefficient on OccDen, although positive for both young and middle-
aged professionals, is much larger for the younger workers.  The positive influence of OccDen 
on hours worked among young and middle-aged professionals is consistent with the presence of 
selection and/or productivity effects.16  The much larger influence of OccDen on young versus 
middle-aged professionals is consistent with a rat race.  The next section focuses more tightly on 
the rat race.  For that reason, from this point on we restrict our analysis to professional workers. 
 
D. Rivalry and inequality among professional workers 
 We begin by constructing an additional variable whose function is to help isolate the 
potential for labor market rivalry (Rival).  As a first step, we calculate the national hourly wage 
distribution for all full-time workers in the individual’s age cohort and occupation grouping men 
                                                 
16Kahn and Lang (1991) find that about half of the workforce would prefer to work more or less, holding the hourly 
wage constant.  A much greater number would prefer to work more.  Our results are at least broadly consistent with 
this finding.  There are fewer professionals than nonprofessionals, and we find behavior consistent with a rat race for 
the former and not the latter.  For nonprofessionals, we find "work spreading," which is consistent with wanting to 
work more and not being able to. 
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and women together.  Next, we add up the number of full-time workers in the individual’s work 
PUMA and occupation that are in the individual’s 5-percentile range in the age- and occupation-
specific national wage distribution.17  As before, person sampling weights are used to ensure that 
the number of rivals present is calculated from a representative sample.  If rivalry effects are 
present for young professionals but not for older professionals, Rival should have a positive 
influence on hours worked among young professionals but not for older professionals. 
    Table 4 presents results from several different models that provide increasingly stringent 
tests for whether rivalry contributes to longer hours worked.  Beginning with the simplest 
specification, Model 3 controls for the influence of PopDen, OccDen, and Rival.18  In this model, 
the effect of PopDen is negative, marginally significant, and nearly identical for both age groups, 
while the effect of OccDen is positive, significant, and also nearly identical for both age groups.  
Controlling for rivalry, therefore, young and middle-aged professionals tend to behave in a 
similar manner, at least with respect to the influence of agglomeration on work hours. 
 Consider next the coefficient on Rival.  The estimated elasticity of hours worked with 
respect to Rival equals .40 percent for young workers (with a t-ratio of 2.58) but minus .68 
percent (with a t-ratio of -3.80) for middle-aged workers.  The negative effect of Rival on 
middle-aged professional work hours is indicative of demand-side effects: an increase in the 
presence of similar workers serves to spread work loads across individuals, reducing individual 
hours worked.  The positive effect of Rival on young professional work hours lends further 
                                                 
17For example, for a 30-year old doctor at the 32nd percentile of the national wage distribution for all doctors in their 
30s (including men and women), we add up the number of doctors in the individual’s work PUMA whose wages are 
in the 30th through 34th percentiles of the national wage distribution. Had the doctor’s wage been at the 36th 
percentile, we would have added up individuals in the 35th through 39th percentiles of the distribution. 
 
18As before, only the agglomeration variables are presented, but all of the variables and the occupation fixed effects 
in Table 2 are included in these models. 
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support to the idea that signaling and rivalry contribute to an urban rat race among young 
professionals. 
 The theory governing rivalrous behavior allows for even more stringent tests.  This is 
because the rat race depends crucially on the rewards to getting ahead.  Eliminate such rewards, 
and the incentive to compete with rivals goes away, or at least is diminished.  This idea is 
consistent with the argument that an unequal wage distribution creates incentives for workers to 
seek advancement and so encourages hard work (e.g. Bell and Freeman (2000)).  Accordingly, 
we specify a variable that captures the degree of wage inequality in professional occupations  
(WageIQR).  This measure equals the inter-quartile range of log-wage rates for full-time workers 
(35 hours or more per week) in the individual’s occupation and age category (young versus 
middle-aged) in the individual’s work PUMA.19 
 When WageIQR is large, there are large rewards to getting ahead in the individual’s 
occupation and local labor market.  In this case, we expect professionals to work longer hours.  
Moreover, when WageIQR equals zero, rivalry effects should disappear, young professionals 
should behave more like middle-aged professionals, and Rival should have a negative effect on 
hours worked as the work load allocated to a group of potential rivals is spread over more 
individuals.  These latter ideas are tested by including interactions between the Rival and 
WageIQR variables in the model. 
 Returning to Table 4, Model 4 adds the wage inequality measure (WageIQR).  The 
corresponding coefficients are positive and highly significant for both age groups.  This is 
consistent with the Bell and Freeman (2000) conclusion that wage inequality increases hours 
worked.  Also, the remaining agglomeration coefficients are little changed from the previous 
                                                 
19The inter-quartile wage variable is calculated using the person weights in the IPUMS to ensure a representative 
measure as with the OccDen and Rival variables.  
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model.  The pattern begins to change in Model 5 where WageIQR is replaced with the interaction 
of Rival and WageIQR.  Although the interactive term is positive and highly significant, absent 
wage inequality (WageIQR equal to zero), the influence of Rival is substantially reduced and no 
longer significant among young professionals. 
 Model 6 provides a complete specification of the Rival and WageIQR variables, with 
direct measures of each along with the interactive term.  Two striking results emerge.  First, the 
coefficient on Rival is now negative and highly significant for young professionals and similar in 
magnitude to the corresponding coefficient among middle-aged professionals.  Second, the 
interactive term is positive, highly significant for both groups, but twice as large for the younger 
workers.  These results are consistent with priors, and they suggest that when the financial 
rewards to getting ahead are zero (WageIQR equal to zero), the presence of rivals (Rival) has 
nearly the same effect on the hours worked of young professionals as for middle-aged 
professionals. The negative coefficient on Rival is suggestive of demand side effects in which the 
work load is spread among a greater number of individuals.  In contrast, as the financial rewards 
to getting ahead increase (WageIQR becomes large), young professionals work longer hours 
relative to middle-age professionals. 
 As a further robustness check, Model 7 interacts the occupation fixed effects with MSA 
fixed effects.  This controls for additional unobserved MSA attributes that might affect hours 
worked, including MSA differences in productivity levels, the local cost of living, and the 
activities carried out by a Census defined occupation.  This approach also increases the number 
of fixed effects from 70 in the previous models to roughly 6,100.  The inclusion of so many fixed 
effects controls for a vast array of unobserved effects, but also has the effect of reducing 
variation in the data, making identification more difficult. 
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 Not surprisingly, in Model 7 the significance of the coefficients on PopDen and OccDen  
is substantially reduced.  This occurs because PopDen and OccDen do not vary within Work 
PUMAs for a given occupation, which limits their variation within MSAs.  On the other hand, 
the rival and wage inequality variables do vary within Work PUMAs for each occupation.  
Estimates of the coefficients on these variables and their interaction are little changed from those 
in Model 6.  This is an important result because it suggests that the various agglomeration 
variables already included in the model largely capture the influence of metropolitan area 
attributes relevant to hours worked among professionals. 
 
D. Wages 
 Do the forces that contribute to hard work in cities also enhance the hourly output and 
productivity of urban workers?  Examining wages enables us to address this question, while 
shedding further light the forces that contribute to the agglomeration-hours worked relationship.  
We are guided by the following principle: with competitive markets, factors that encourage 
longer work hours without commensurate gains in output result in lower hourly wages.  Thus, if 
the extra work is matched by a greater than proportionate increase in output, then hourly wages 
will rise. 
 Tables 5 and 6 replicate the specifications in Tables 3 and 4, with log of hours worked 
replacing log of hourly wage.  In Table 5, Model 1 shows that wages are higher in more densely 
populated areas (PopDen) for both professional and non-professional workers.  However, as with 
the hours worked analysis, in Model 2 it is clear that localization effects – measured by the 
density of employment in the worker’s occupation – are the driving force behind higher wages in 
urbanized areas.  Specifically, the coefficients on PopDen are negative in all cases, while the 
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coefficients on OccDen are positive and highly significant for all groups.  For professionals, the 
OccDen wage elasticity is 5 percent for younger workers and 6.7 percent for middle-aged 
workers.  For non-professionals the analogous elasticities are 3.1 and 3.8 percent, respectively.  
Thus, localization effects appear to be stronger for professionals relative to non-professionals, 
and for middle-aged workers relative to younger workers.  Assuming that older workers and 
professionals are more skilled, this suggests that the productivity gains associated with 
localization are larger for more highly-skilled segments of the workforce.   
 In Table 6, we add controls for local rivals, restricting attention to professional workers.  
Adding these controls does not affect the qualitative impact of PopDen and OccDen.  As 
reported before, for example, the elasticity with respect to OccDen is 50 to 100 percent larger for 
middle-aged professionals than for younger professionals.  A very different pattern is evident 
with regard to the influence of local rivals.  In Model 7, for example, the direct effect of Rival is 
positive, highly significant, and twice as large for young professionals as for middle-aged 
professionals.  In addition, the interactive term has an elasticity of minus 11.36 percent for young 
professionals and is highly significant, but is small, positive, and insignificant for middle-aged 
professionals. 
 How should these results be interpreted?  The negative coefficients on PopDen could 
indicate either that congestion is costly to firms or that workers enjoy amenities found in densely 
populated areas, both of which would serve to reduce wages.  In contrast, the positive 
coefficients on OccDen suggest that cities are productive places not so much because of their 
size per se, but because of the concentration of activity within individual occupations.  This 
finding is consistent with some prior studies of employment growth in cities (e.g. Henderson et 
al (1995), Rosenthal and Strange (2003a)).  This finding is also consistent with recent work on 
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agglomeration and wages.  Glaeser and Mare (1999), for example, report evidence that wages are 
higher in large cities, consistent with our findings in Model 1 (Table 5).  Wheaton and Lewis 
(2001) find evidence that localization effects contribute to higher wages, consistent with our 
results in Model 2 (Table 5).20  In addition, the positive coefficients on OccDen suggest that 
some combination of selection and productivity effects enhance the average hourly output of 
urban professionals.  That is exactly what one would expect to the extent that agglomerated labor 
markets make workers more valuable while also attracting talented individuals.21 
 These findings are in the spirit of the well-known Marshall (1890,1920) vs. Jacobs (1969) 
debate on whether localization or urbanization economies are more important.22  The results on 
the rival variable address an entirely different aspect of agglomeration economies.   As noted 
above, the interactive term Rival*WageIQR has a significantly negative and large coefficient for 
young professionals, but is positive, small, and insignificant for middle-aged professionals.  
Among young professionals, therefore, the extra hours worked arising from rivalrous behavior 
(as documented in Table 4) is not matched by a corresponding increase in output, causing hourly 
wages to fall.  This result is consistent with diminishing marginal productivity of work effort, in 
other words, fatigue.  The result is also in the spirit of Saxenian (1994), and adds to the literature 
                                                 
20 Neither Wheaton and Lewis (2001) nor Glaeser and Mare (1999), however, identify the marginal effects of both 
the overall level of urbanization and employment concentration within individual industries, in contrast to our 
specifications here.  In addition, Wheaton and Lewis (2001) and Glaeser and Mare (1999) use total counts of 
workers and residents when measuring agglomeration while we express our agglomeration measures in terms of the 
density of development.  In this regard, our agglomeration measures are closer in spirit to the measures used by 
Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Rosenthal and Strange (2003a). 
 
21 Glaeser and Mare (1999) take pains to distinguish between selection and productivity effects that contribute to 
higher urban wages.  After drawing on a variety of datasets and methods, they conclude that productivity effects 
undoubtedly contribute to higher big city wages, although selection effects may play a role as well. 
 
22 For instance, Glaeser et al (1992) and Henderson et al (1995). 
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in which the nature of urban interactions is crucial to agglomeration economies (see also 
Rosenthal and Strange (2003a)).23 
 
F. Magnitudes 
 This paper has analyzed the effects of agglomeration on hours worked and wages.  A 
clear pattern has emerged, the key features of which are the differences between the effects of 
agglomeration on professionals versus non-professionals and young versus middle-aged workers.  
This section will further characterize the economic importance of these differences. 
 Earlier in the paper, Model 2 of Table 3 showed that OccDen had different effects on 
hours for young and middle-aged professionals.  To get a sense of the magnitude of these 
estimates, we calculate the impact of OccDen on hours worked for the two groups of cities in 
Table 1 (New York, Chicago,Los Angeles and Hartford, Milwaukee, Sacramento).  Among 
young professionals, on average, localization effects (OccDen) increase hours worked in the 
larger cities by 0.7 percent relative to the smaller cities.  This is equivalent to roughly 16 
additional work hours per year assuming a 45 hour work week for 50 weeks.  Among middle-
aged professionals OccDen increases hours worked in the larger cities by .28 percent relative to 
the smaller cities, an increase of 6.3 hours per year.  As a point of comparison, consensus 
estimates of the magnitude of agglomeration economies associated with a doubling of city size 
are roughly 4% (Rosenthal and Strange (2003b)).   Of course, the hours-worked numbers 
discussed here are based on a model that does not separately identify the influence of rivalrous 
behavior. 
                                                 
23 Our findings regarding the influence of rivals contrast with  Porter (1990), whose analysis stresses the 
productivity benefits of competition among producers.  In our case, competition among rivals appears to contribute 
to signaling that is not necessarily productivity enhancing. 
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 In Table 7, therefore, we examine the degree to which the presence of rivals contributes 
to hours worked and hourly wage rates among young and middle-aged professionals for the same 
two groups of cities.  This is done by applying the Rival and Rival*WageIQR coefficients from 
Model 7 of Tables 4 and 6 to the individual level data and then averaging across observations.24 
 Several patterns stand out.  First, rivals have a substantial impact on hours worked for 
young professionals, as shown by the first row and first four columns of the table.  The presence 
of rivals increases the hours worked among younger workers by 2.3 percent in the larger cities.  
This translates into just over 1 additional hour worked per week or the equivalent of about one 
extra week of work per year – a very large effect.  In the smaller cities, this effect is only half as 
large.  In addition, the presence of rivals reduces hours worked among middle-aged professionals 
by 2 percent in both groups of cities.  It is clear, therefore, that the presence of rivals 
substantially elevates hours worked among young professionals relative to middle-aged 
professionals, and this effect is most pronounced in the largest cities. 
 The remaining four columns of the table consider the influence of rivals on wages.  Here 
too the patterns are revealing.  Among young professionals, the presence of rivals has a similar 
influence on wage rates in both groups of cities, adding roughly 13 percent to hourly wage.  
Among middle-aged professionals, the presence of rivals also has a similar influence on wage 
rates in both groups of cities, but here the impact is much larger, roughly 25 percent.  The large 
positive impact of rivals on middle-aged wage rates is suggestive that for this group the presence 
of similar workers enhances productivity.  However, consistent with our earlier discussions, the 
much smaller impact of rivals on the wage rates of younger professionals is suggestive of worker 
fatigue, possibly the result of long hours spent signaling.  
                                                 
24 Sampling weights were used when averaging to ensure a representative result. 
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 Finally, the second row of Table 7 highlights the impact of the presence of rivals on 
hours worked and wage rates for young and middle-aged lawyers, a profession famous for its 
long hours and also the focus of recent work by Landers et al (1996).25  It is immediately 
apparent that the influence of rivals on hours worked and wage rates for lawyers is qualitatively 
the same as for all professionals.  However, it is also clear that the presence of rivals has a 
substantially larger impact on the hours worked of young lawyers relative to all young 
professionals.  Specifically, proximity to rivals elevates hours worked among young lawyers by 
1.9 percent in the three moderate sized cities and by 3.8 percent in the larger cities.  Lawyers, it 
would seem, deserve some of their reputation for rivalrous behavior, at least among younger 
individuals. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 This paper is the first to systematically document a relationship between hours worked 
and agglomeration.  In doing so, we find convincing evidence that among non-professional 
workers, agglomeration tends to spread out workloads over a larger number of individuals, 
resulting in diminished individual hours worked.  Among professional workers, the pattern is 
different.  Here, agglomeration increases hours worked.  Using differencing methods, the paper 
finds evidence of both selection and productivity effects and also of the rat race effect.  The 
paper is, therefore, one of very few to have provided empirical evidence in support of Akerlof’s 
(1976) theory of the rat race.   
                                                 
25 In constructing these measures we first estimated the hours worked and wage models separately for lawyers and 
judges including metropolitan fixed effects as in Model 7 in Tables 4 and 6. 
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 The paper can also be seen as contributing to the literature on agglomeration.   Over 
eighty years ago Marshall (1890, 1920) argued that cities are productive places because they 
allow for pooling of labor, sharing of intermediate inputs, and knowledge spillovers.  This paper 
adds to that list by providing evidence that industrious professionals are drawn to agglomerated 
areas, and that agglomeration requires professionals to work harder.  This provides an entirely 
new explanation for why cities are productive and in so doing adds to our knowledge of the 
nature and benefits of agglomeration and related economies of scale. 
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Table 1: Average Hours Worked Among Full-Time Workers In Select Metropolitan Areasa 
 
Occupation Category Metropolitan Area Young Males Middle Aged Males 
Non-Professional 
Workersb 
New York, Chicago, Los 
Angeles 
 
43.58 43.55 
 Hartford, Milwaukee, 
Sacramento 
 
43.72 44.02 
Professional Workers 
(including Lawyers & 
Judges)b 
New York, Chicago, Los 
Angeles 
 
48.12 46.77 
 Hartford, Milwaukee, 
Sacramento 
 
47.21 46.77 
Lawyers and Judges New York, Chicago, Los 
Angeles 
 
50.06 48.63 
 Hartford, Milwaukee, 
Sacramento 
 
47.71 48.75 
aAll data are weighted to be representative using the perwt variable in the IPUMs. Hours worked are based on 
the “usual hours worked per week”.  Only individuals working 35 hours or more per week are included in the 
sample. 
 
bProfessional workers are individuals in occupations categorized as Professional-Technical in the OCC1950 
variable of the IPUMS and who have a Masters degree or more. Non-Professionals include all other workers 
except managers and agricultural workers and who have less than a Bachelors degree. 
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Table 2: MALE WORKERS – 35 Hours or More Per Week 
Usual Hours Worked Per Week in the Last Year 
Professional Versus Non-Professional Workers 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Hours Worked 
(t-ratios in parentheses; Robust standard errors with clustering on Work PUMAs) 
  
 Professional Workersa Non-Professional Workersb 
 Age 30-40 Age 41-50 Age 30-40 Age 41-50 
Professional or Ph.D. Degreec 
 
0.043 
(17.42) 
.0462 
(19.73) 
  
Some College or Associate Degreec 
 
  .0047 
(5.87) 
.0033 
(3.62) 
High School Degreec 
 
  .0161 
(17.25) 
.0154 
(15.27) 
Have Children 
 
.0034 
(1.62) 
-.0008 
(-0.38) 
.0096 
(13.14) 
.0050 
(6.24) 
Married 
 
.0125 
(5.53) 
.0204 
(8.04) 
.0131 
(17.52) 
.0094 
(10.97) 
Age 
 
-.0036 
( -0.60) 
-.0038 
(-0.39) 
.0053 
(2.75) 
.0112 
(3.03) 
Age Squared 
 
.00002 
(0.28) 
.00004 
(0.35) 
-.00008 
(-2.91) 
-.00001 
(-3.03) 
Black 
 
-.0270 
( -5.86) 
-.0285 
(-5.94) 
-.0344 
(-34.44) 
-.0332 
(-28.35) 
Asian 
 
-.0270 
(-6.87) 
-.0364 
(-8.48) 
-.0062 
(-1.37) 
-.0007 
(-0.14) 
Hispanic 
 
-.0179 
(-3.81) 
-.0163 
(-3.07) 
-.0252 
(-17.85) 
-.0256 
(-14.75) 
Other Race 
 
-.0126 
( -0.87) 
-.0160 
(-3.07) 
-.0175 
(-4.83) 
-.0108 
(-2.84) 
Immigrated 6-10 years agod 
 
-.0079 
(-1.39) 
.0039 
(0.42) 
-.0029 
(-0.99) 
-.0109 
(-2.69) 
Immigrated 11-15 years agod 
 
-.0079 
(-1.42) 
.0172 
(1.68) 
-.0065 
(-2.07) 
-.0081 
(-1.95) 
Immigrated 16-20 years agod 
 
.0143 
(1.68) 
.0253 
(2.85) 
-.0020 
(-0.58) 
-.0062 
(-1.62) 
Immigrated > 21 yrs or Nat. US Citizend .0103 
(2.29) 
.0207 
(2.85) 
-.0073 
(-2.76) 
-.0155 
(-4.44) 
Log commute time -.0108 
(-10.16) 
-.0134 
(-13.03) 
-.0067 
(-12.83) 
-.0089 
(-16.68) 
Log  population density of Work PUMA .0011 
(1.79) 
.00005 
(0.96) 
-.0012 
(-3.68) 
-.0011 
(-3.30) 
Constant 
 
3.892 
(36.83) 
3.857 
(17.39) 
3.686 
(111.95) 
3.529 
(42.29) 
No. of Occupation Fixed effects 71 70 135 133 
No. Observations 56,940 55,079 465,254 295,441 
Adj R2 0.2045 0.1537 0.0750 0.0760 
Root MSE 0.1745 0.1746 0.1617 0.1604 
aProfessional workers belong to “professional and technical” occupations and have a Masters or higher degree. 
bNon-professional workers belong to non-professional and non-technical occupations and have less than a BA degree. 
cOmitted categories for salaried and hourly workers are Masters Degree and less than high school degree, respectively. 
dOmitted category is immigrated in the last five years. 
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Table 3: MALE WORKERS – 35 Hours or More Per Weeka 
Usual Hours Worked Per Week in the Last Year 
Professional Versus Non-Professional Workers 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Hours Worked 
(t-ratios in parentheses; Robust standard errors with clustering on Work PUMAs) 
   
 Professionalsb Non-Professionalsc 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Age 30-40 Age 41-50 Age 30-40 Age 41-50 Age 30-40 Age 41-50 Age 30-40 Age 41-50 
Log  population density of Work PUMA 
(PopDen) 
 
.0011 
(1.79) 
.00005 
(0.96) 
-.0032 
(-2.52) 
-.0018 
(-1.28) 
-.0012 
(-3.68) 
-.0011 
(-3.30) 
.0004 
(0.46) 
.0005 
(0.54) 
Log employment  density of worker’s 
occupation in Work PUMA (OccDen) 
 
  .0043 
(3.63) 
.0024 
(1.96) 
  -.0016 
(-2.06) 
-.0016 
(-2.08) 
No. of Occupation Fixed effects 71 70  71 70 135 133 135 133 
No. Observations 56,940 55,079 56,940 55,078 465,254 295,441 465,254 295,440 
Adj R2 0.2045 0.1537 0.2048 0.1538 0.0750 0.0760 0.0750 0.0761 
Root MSE 0.1745 0.1746 0.1745 0.1746 0.1617 0.1604 0.1617 0.1604 
aAll other variables listed in Table 2 are also included in the model but their coefficients are suppressed to conserve space. 
bProfessional workers belong to “professional and technical” occupations and have a Masters or higher degree. 
cNon-professional workers belong to non-professional and non-technical occupations and have less than a Bachelors degree. 
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Table 4: PROFESSIONAL MALE WORKERS – 35 Hours or More Per Weeka,b 
Usual Hours Worked Per Week in the Last Year 
Alternative Specifications of Occupation Density Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Hours Worked 
(t-ratios in parentheses; Robust standard errors with clustering on Work PUMAs) 
  
 Age 30-40 Age 41-50 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Log population density of Work PUMA (PopDen) 
 
 
-.0024 
(-1.66) 
-.0020 
(-1.54) 
-.0021 
(-1.43) 
-.0024 
(-1.76) 
-.0018 
(-1.06) 
-.0024 
(-1.60) 
-.0021 
(-1.42) 
-.0020 
(-1.35) 
-.0019 
(-1.30) 
-.0017 
(-0.93) 
Log employment  density of worker’s occupation in 
Work PUMA (OccDen) 
 
.0032 
(2.30) 
.0027 
(1.87) 
.0025 
(1.80) 
.0029 
(2.09) 
.0014 
(0.82) 
.0036 
(2.54) 
.0031 
(2.21) 
.0029 
(2.11) 
.0028 
(2.05) 
.0024 
(1.41) 
Log number of workers in the  individual’s age group, 
occupation, and Work PUMA within 5 percentage 
points in the occupation-age national wage 
distribution (Rival)c 
 
.0040 
(2.58) 
.0040 
(2.56) 
.0009 
(0.57) 
-.0081 
(-4.06) 
-.0126 
(-5.44) 
-.0068 
(-3.80) 
-.0068 
(-3.81) 
-.0082 
(-4.63) 
-.0124 
(-4.66) 
-.0101 
(-3.92) 
Interquartile range of log wages in worker’s 
occupation in the worker’s Work PUMA (WageIQR) 
 
- .0124 
(5.44) 
- -.0507 
(-5.80) 
-.0726 
(-6.59) 
- .0076 
(3.68) 
- -.0270 
(-2.48) 
-.0181 
(-1.51) 
Interactive Term: Rival x WageIQR 
 
- - .00073 
(7.15) 
.0205 
(7.48) 
.0270 
(7.66) 
- - .0030 
(4.32) 
.0114 
(3.22) 
.0078 
(2.05) 
No. of Occupation Fixed effects 71 71 71 71 - 70 70 70 70 - 
No. of Occupation and MSA Fixed Effects - - - - 6443 - - - - 6,102 
No. Observations 51,302 51,302 51,302 51,302 51,302 49,673 49,673 49,673 49,673 49,673 
Adj R2 0.2093 0.2100 0.2105 0.2113 0.2100 0.1555 0.1558 0.1560 0.1561 0.1607 
Root MSE .1724 .1723 .1723 .1722 .1723 .1721 .1721 .1721 .1721 .1716 
aAll other variables listed in Table 2 are also included in the model but their coefficients are suppressed to conserve space. 
b Professional workers belong to “professional and technical” occupations and have a Masters or higher degree. 
cRival is calculated by counting the number of workers in the individual’s Work PUMA in the same occupation and age category (young versus middle-aged) within 5 
percentage points in the national wage distribution pertinent to the individual.  For these purposes, national wage distribution is measured using all (male and female) full-time 
workers (35 hours or more per week) for the same occupation and age category (young versus middle-aged) as the individual. 
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Table 5: MALE WORKERS – 35 Hours or More Per Weeka 
Professional Versus Non-Professional Workers 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Wages 
(t-ratios in parentheses; Robust standard errors with clustering on Work PUMAs) 
  
 Professionalsb Non-Professionalsc 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Age 30-40 Age 41-50 Age 30-40 Age 41-50 Age 30-40 Age 41-50 Age 30-40 Age 41-50 
Log  population density of Work PUMA 
(PopDen) 
 
.0113 
(4.01) 
.0180 
(5.41) 
-.0374 
(-3.99) 
-.0461 
(-7.48) 
.0220 
(8.89) 
.0209 
(7.57) 
-.0081 
(-1.24) 
-.0166 
(-2.25) 
Log employment  density of worker’s 
occupation in Work PUMA (OccDen) 
 
    .0499 
(5.61) 
 .0669 
(11.31) 
   .0307 
(5.58) 
 .0382 
(6.14) 
No. of Occupation Fixed effects 71 70 71 70 134 133 134 133 
No. Observations 51302 49674 51302 49673 440148 276350 440148 276349 
Adj R2 0.1895 0.2210 0.1930 0.2265 0.1615 0.1654 0.1625 0.1669 
Root MSE .60692 .59709 .60562 .59499 .52264 .53815 .52233 .53766 
aAll other variables listed in Table 2 are also included in the model but their coefficients are suppressed to conserve space. 
bProfessional workers belong to “professional and technical” occupations and have a Masters or higher degree. 
cNon-professional workers belong to non-professional and non-technical occupations and have less than a Bachelors degree. 
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Table 6: PROFESSIONAL MALE WORKERS – 35 Hours or More Per Weeka,b 
Alternative Specifications of Occupation Density Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Wages 
 (t-ratios in parentheses; Robust standard errors with clustering on Work PUMAs) 
 
 Age 30-40 Age 41-50 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Log population density of Work PUMA (PopDen) 
 
 
-.0194 
(-3.04) 
-.0239 
(-3.55) 
-.0234 
(  -3.36) 
-.0222 
(-3.09) 
-.0296 
(-4.52) 
 -.0311 
(-5.08) 
-.0355 
(-5.31) 
-.0355 
(-5.24) 
-.0346 
(-5.20) 
 -.0549 
(-6.96) 
Log employment  density of worker’s occupation in 
Work PUMA (OccDen) 
 
.0252 
(4.44) 
 .0323 
(5.28) 
 .0323 
(5.19) 
 .0313 
(4.92) 
  .0299 
(4.57) 
  .0424 
(7.07) 
 .0490 
(7.48) 
 .0490 
(7.37) 
 .0478 
(7.23) 
   .0543 
(7.00) 
Log number of workers in the  individual’s age group, 
occupation, and Work PUMA within 5 percentage 
points in the occupation-age national wage 
distribution (Rival)c 
 
.0607 
(5.07) 
 .0610 
(5.02) 
 .0905 
(7.34) 
 .1172 
(9.66) 
 .1036 
(7.26) 
  .0846 
(9.73) 
 .0844 
(9.71) 
 .0996 
(11.78) 
 .0610 
(5.33) 
  .0491 
(4.09) 
Interquartile range of log wages in worker’s 
occupation in the worker’s Work PUMA (WageIQR) 
 
-  -.1433 
(-10.00) 
-  .1503 
(2.30) 
 .1795 
(2.53) 
- -.1064 
(-7.28) 
- -.2507 
(-3.60) 
 -.2062 
(-2.39) 
Interactive Term: Rival x WageIQR 
 
- - -.0499 
(-10.59) 
-.0951 
(-4.51) 
-.1136 
(-4.94) 
- - -.0308 
(-6.15) 
 .0476 
(2.06) 
  .0232 
(0.83) 
No. of Occupation Fixed effects 71 71 71 71 - 70 70 70 70 - 
No. of Occupation and MSA Fixed Effects - - - - 6443  - - - - 6102 
No. Observations 51302 51302 51302 51302 51302 49673 49673 49673 49673 49673 
Adj R2 0.1976 0.2050 0.2068 0.2074 0.2255 0.2356 0.2397 0.2389 0.2401 0.2651 
Root MSE .60389  .6011 .60041 .60019 .59329 .59148 .58987 .59017 .58972 .57992 
aAll other variables listed in Table 2 are also included in the model but their coefficients are suppressed to conserve space. 
b Professional workers belong to “professional and technical” occupations and have a Masters or higher degree. 
cRival is calculated by counting the number of workers in the individual’s Work PUMA in the same occupation and age category (young versus middle-aged) within 5 
percentage points in the national wage distribution pertinent to the individual.  For these purposes, national wage distribution is measured using all (male and female) full-time 
workers (35 hours or more per week) for the same occupation and age category (young versus middle-aged) as the individual. 
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Table 7: The Influence of Rivals on Hours Worked and Wages in Large and Moderate Sized Citiesa 
 
 Percentage Impact on Hours Worked Percentage Impact on Wages 
 Young Males Middle Aged Males Young Males Middle Aged Males 
 
New York, 
Chicago, 
Los Angeles 
Hartford, 
Milwaukee, 
Sacramento 
New York, 
Chicago, 
Los Angeles 
Hartford, 
Milwaukee, 
Sacramento 
New York, 
Chicago, 
Los Angeles 
Hartford, 
Milwaukee, 
Sacramento 
New York, 
Chicago, 
Los Angeles 
Hartford, 
Milwaukee, 
Sacramento 
All Professionalsb 2.30 1.10 -2.08 -2.09 13.0 13.7 26.9 22.0 
Lawyers and Judges 3.79 1.92 -1.34 -1.70 13.4 13.5 34.3 23.5 
aEstimates were obtained by forming θ1Rival + θ2Rival*WageIQR for each individual observation in the sample and then averaging across individuals 
while applying the sampling weights (“perwt”) in the IPUMs to ensure a representative result.  Estimates of θ1 and θ2 for the “All Professionals” results 
were obtained from Model 7 in Tables 4 and 6.  For the “Lawyers and Judges” results, Model 7 was estimated using only lawyers in the sample and 
estimates from those regressions (for hours and wages) used to compute the influence of rivals. 
  
bProfessional workers are in occupations categorized as Professional-Technical in the OCC1950 variable of the IPUMS and who have a Masters degree 
or more. Non-Professionals include all other workers except managers and agricultural workers and who have less than a Bachelors degree.  Lawyers 
and Judges belong occupation category (OCC1950) 55 and have a Masters degree or more. 
 
